Ingram v. Bolanos, No. 3:2022cv02457 - Document 24 (N.D. Cal. 2024)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge William H. Orrick on 05/03/2024. (jmd, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/3/2024) Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 SIRVONTRE INGRAM, Plaintiff, 5 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 6 7 Case No. 22-cv-02457-WHO (PR) CARLOS G. BOLANOS, Dkt. No. 22 Defendant. 8 9 INTRODUCTION United States District Court Northern District of California 10 11 Plaintiff Sirvontre Ingram alleges in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action that his jailor, the 12 San Mateo County Sheriff, instituted a policy that prevented him from receiving any mail, 13 thereby violating his First Amendment rights. Defendant Sheriff Bolanos moves for 14 summary judgment on grounds that Ingram did not exhaust his administrative remedies 15 and that there was no such policy. The motion is unopposed; Ingram filed no response to 16 defendant’s motion. I will grant summary judgment: Ingram did not exhaust his administrative remedies 17 18 regarding his claim that in April 2021 defendant instituted a policy preventing inmates 19 from receiving any mail. And even if Ingram had exhausted his administrative remedies, 20 he has not presented evidence that any such policy existed. Accordingly, defendant’s 21 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Ingram alleges that in April 2021 his jailors at the San Mateo County Sheriff’s 24 Office instituted a policy that stopped all incoming mail for prisoners. (First Am. Compl., 25 Dkt. No. 13 at 2-3.) Defendant contends that Ingram has not exhausted his administrative 26 remedies and that there was no such policy. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (MSJ), Dkt. No. 22 27 at 3.) 28 1 i. Defendant avers that “[a]t no point during the time that Plaintiff was in the Sheriff’s 2 United States District Court Northern District of California Defendant’s Summary of Mail Policies 3 Office custody did the Sheriff’s Office prohibit Plaintiff [from] receiving any mail.” 4 (MSJ, Gilletti Decl., Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 9.) In April 2021, all mail sent to inmates (other than 5 legal mail) was “searched in accordance with the Sheriff’s Office’s Corrections Division’s 6 Policy and Procedures Manual” for contraband before being delivered to inmates. (MSJ, 7 Dkt. No. 22 at 4.) Any mail containing contraband (such as money orders, drugs, or 8 pornography) was withheld from inmates and returned to the sender with a notice. (Id.) A 9 copy of the returned mail notice was given to the inmate to whom the mail was addressed. 10 (Id.) “At some point in 2021, the Sherriff’s Office started scanning the Regular Mail and 11 delivering most personal mail via an electronic tablets [sic] to better prevent contraband 12 from entering its facilities.” (Id.) “Even with this change, inmates still received their 13 Regular Mail that complied with Sheriff’s Office’s policies.” (Id.) 14 ii. 15 Ingram’s Grievances Ingram was in the custody of the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office from about 16 March 2021 to November 2022. (Id. at 3.) While there Ingram filed eight grievances, four 17 of which raise claims regarding mail access. (Id. at 4.) 18 • On June 3, 2021, he filed a grievance complaining about a lack of “equal 19 access” to the “visiting kiosks” or “messaging via the tablets.” (Id., Gilletti 20 Decl., Dkt. No. 22-1 at 14); 21 • On June 5, 2021, he filed a grievance in which he accused prison officials of 22 tampering with his mail and limiting the amount of mail he was allowed to 23 receive. (Id. at 16); 24 25 26 • On July 23, 2021, he alleged in a grievance that he had not received packets of photographs that had been sent to the facility. (Id. at 20); • On October 30, 2021, he filed a grievance alleging that he sent mail 27 containing personal pictures but when the enveloped was delivered to the 28 recipient, it was empty. (Id. at 22). 2 1 2 dated June 5, 2021. In that one, Ingram complains about “mail tampering” and that his 3 jailors are violating “Title 15 1063” which states that there is “no limitation on the volume 4 of mail that an inmate may send or receive.” (Id. at 16.) He states that he was “forced to 5 agree with the new mail system that this County has unlawfully put into place,” and he 6 asks that “his mail rights . . . be restarted to their proper legal compasity [sic].” (Id.) 7 United States District Court Northern District of California The only grievance that might be relevant for purposes of exhaustion is the one STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits 9 demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant 10 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those 11 which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 12 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 13 reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 14 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 15 those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of 16 a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 17 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 18 affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 19 moving party. On an issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden 20 of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out “that there is an 21 absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 22 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go 23 beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts 24 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court is 25 concerned only with disputes over material facts and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant 26 or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the 27 court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 28 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with 3 1 reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the 2 nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 3 a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted). DISCUSSION 4 I. United States District Court Northern District of California 5 EXHAUSTION 6 Defendant contends in his motion for summary judgment that Ingram did not 7 exhaust his claim that defendant instituted a policy that prevented him from receiving any 8 mail. Ingram has not filed any response to the motion, which is therefore unopposed. 9 Prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies properly before filing suit in 10 federal court, as mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 11 632, 638-641 (2016); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). “No action shall be 12 brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 13 law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 14 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner 15 is required to exhaust the grievance procedures that are “capable of use” to obtain “some 16 relief for the action complained of.” Blake, 578 U.S. at 642 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 17 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2006)). Unless the administrative process is not available, “the 18 PLRA’s text suggests no limits on an inmate’s obligation to exhaust —irrespective of any 19 ‘special circumstances.’” Id. at 639. “[T]hat mandatory language means a court may not 20 excuse a failure to exhaust.” Id. The prison’s requirements define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. Jones v. 21 22 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Proper exhaustion requires using all steps of an 23 administrative process and complying with “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” 24 Ngo, 548 U.S. at 90. The exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an 25 untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 26 84. 27 28 The defendant bears the burden of proving that an administrative remedy was available to the prisoner and that he failed to exhaust such remedy. Albino v. Baca, 747 4 1 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). “Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner 2 has the burden of production. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward 3 with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing 4 and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. United States District Court Northern District of California 5 The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is unopposed. A district court may 6 not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing party has failed to 7 file an opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) 8 (unopposed motion may be granted only after court determines that there are no material 9 issues of fact). The court may, however, grant an unopposed motion for summary 10 judgment if the movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not 11 on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. See United States v. Real Property at 12 Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (local rule cannot mandate automatic 13 entry of judgment for moving party without consideration of whether motion and 14 supporting papers satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 56), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Degen v. 15 United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996); Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th 16 Cir. 1993) (same). 17 Defendant has presented evidence that an administrative remedy was available to 18 Ingram — he filed eight grievances during his custody — and that he did not exhaust his 19 mail claims. The only grievance that might be relevant for purposes of exhaustion is the 20 one dated June 5, 2021. In that one, Ingram complains about “mail tampering” and that his 21 jailors are violating “Title 15 1063” which states that there is “no limitation on the volume 22 of mail that an inmate may send or receive.” (MSJ, Gilletti Decl., Dkt. No. 22-1 at 16.) 23 He states that he was “forced to agree with the new mail system that this County has 24 unlawfully put into place” and he asks that “his mail rights . . . be restarted to their proper 25 legal compasity [sic].” (Id.) This grievance does not allege that there was a new policy 26 that stopped all mail. Rather, it states that Ingram’s jailors are violating existing mail 27 policy by limiting the volume of mail and that he had to agree to the new mail system, 28 presumably the system of electronic tablets and kiosks. Also, the operative complaint 5 1 states that the new full-stoppage policy was instituted in April. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. 2 No. 13 at 2.) The grievance was not filed until June. Ingram has not shown a genuine 3 dispute of material fact, and the papers in support of the motion for summary judgment are 4 evidence that Ingram did not exhaust his claims. Defendant’s papers are sufficient to 5 support the motion and do not on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. 6 Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 7 8 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 II. MERITS Even if Ingram had exhausted his administrative remedies, Ingram has not shown that the full-stoppage policy was ever created, let alone implemented. Defendant has 10 presented evidence that there was no such policy in the Policy and Procedures Manual at 11 the time of the alleged stoppage, nor was one ever created or implemented. (MSJ, Gilletti 12 Decl., Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶¶ 6-9.) Ingram has not filed any opposition to the motion and 13 therefore has not created a genuine dispute of material fact that there was such a policy. 14 His supposition that there was such a policy is not evidence. That there were delays in 15 accessing mail on the new system of electronic tablets — as he mentioned in his June 3 16 grievance — does not constitute a full-stoppage of mail. Accordingly, defendant’s motion 17 for summary judgment is GRANTED. CONCLUSION 18 19 Defendant Bolanos’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 22.) 20 The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of defendant, and 21 close the file. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 3, 2024 _________________________ WILLIAM H. ORRICK United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 6
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