Goodman v. Coolvestment LLC, No. 3:2023cv05456 - Document 49 (W.D. Wash. 2024)
Court Description: ORDER denying Defendant's 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Tiffany M. Cartwright.(MW)
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Goodman v. Coolvestment LLC Doc. 49 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 6 7 8 MARIE GOODMAN, Plaintiff, 9 10 11 12 Case No. 3:23-cv-05456-TMC ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. COOLVESTMENT LLC, Defendant. 13 14 Before the Court is Defendant Coolvestment LLC’s motion for summary judgment 15 (Dkt. 33). Because the outcome of Plaintiff Marie Goodman’s claim turns on genuine factual 16 disputes that must be resolved by a jury, the Court DENIES the motion. 17 18 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 11, 2023, Goodman filed her complaint in Clark County Superior Court 19 asserting (1) a claim against Coolvestment as the owner and operator of the Days Inn of 20 Vancouver, Washington under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), 21 RCW 49.60.030, for denying her hotel accommodation when she refused to pay a prohibited fee 22 for her service dog; and (2) a claim against Coolvestment’s hotel manager for aiding and abetting 23 disability discrimination. Dkt. 1-1 at 4–5. 24 On May 18, 2023, Coolvestment removed the case to this Court (Dkt. 1) and answered ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Goodman’s complaint on May 22 (Dkt. 7). Goodman amended her complaint on August 16, 2 2023, to identify the defendant hotel manager as Nirav Patel. Dkt. 13. On February 23, 2024, 3 Coolvestment moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 33. 4 On March 12, 2024, the parties agreed to dismiss Eugene McNerney (Goodman’s 5 fiancée) as a plaintiff, dismiss all of Goodman’s claims against Coolvestment’s hotel manager 6 Nirav Patel, and dismiss all of Patel and Coolvestment’s counterclaims. Dkt. 37 at 1–2. 7 Goodman then responded to Coolvestment’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 39) and 8 Coolvestment replied as to her remaining claim of disability discrimination in a place of public 9 accommodation (Dkt. 43). 10 11 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The facts that follow are based on the evidence in the record taken in the light most 12 favorable to Plaintiff Goodman, with all genuine disputes and reasonable inferences resolved in 13 her favor, as required at summary judgment. 14 On November 25, 2022, Goodman traveled to Vancouver, Washington with her fiancée 15 McNerney to view real estate in the area. Dkt. 40 at 2. She had made a two-night reservation 16 through Expedia to stay at the Days Inn. Id. Goodman has impaired hearing and uses a service 17 dog to assist with emergency awareness and when out in public. Id. Goodman left her dog in 18 their truck when she and McNerney went to check into the hotel, but she informed the hotel 19 manager at the front desk, Nirav Patel, that she had a service dog that would be staying with her 20 at the hotel. Id. According to Goodman’s sworn declaration, Patel then handed her a “pet form” 21 to complete and informed her that she would need to pay a “pet fee.” Id. 22 Goodman testified at her deposition that she then told Patel that her service dog was not a 23 pet and he responded she would still have to pay the fee. Dkt. 42-2 at 3. According to 24 Goodman’s testimony, when she protested that a fee could not be charged for a service animal ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 1 under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Patel became increasingly hostile in response. Id. at 2 2 (“[Patel] began to get a little hostile and [McNerney] stepped in to try to communicate with him 3 because I was having a harder time because of his accent, but it got more and more hostile.”). 4 Goodman’s fiancée, Eugene McNerney, was also present and intervened when Patel 5 became hostile towards Goodman. Dkt. 41 at 2. McNerney testified in his declaration that the 6 form handed to Goodman was a pet agreement “with the rules for having a pet at the hotel and an 7 agreement to pay a pet fee.” Id. He stated that Patel said Goodman was not being charged a pet 8 fee, Dkt. 42-4 at 2 (“[Mr. Patel] said no, we weren’t being charged. And [Goodman] said yes, 9 and she was – she was reading the paperwork and – and pointing at it.”), but Goodman recalled 10 that the pet form contained a pet fee. See Dkt. 42-2 at 4 (“Q. Okay. So despite English being 11 [Patel’s] second language and your condition of being hearing impaired, your testimony is 12 there’s no chance that one of you misunderstood the other during your exchange? A. No. And the 13 reason why is because the paper said very clearly in English, ‘Pet fee, $25.’”). 14 Patel testified at his deposition that Goodman had refused the hotel’s incidental fees and 15 that he had tried to explain how that fee was mandatory but would be refunded at checkout. 16 Dkt. 42-1 at 4. He also maintained that when Goodman informed him she had a service animal, 17 he had told her that while the hotel charged pet fees, it would not charge them for a service 18 animal. Id. at 5 (“They said they had service animal. I said, that’s not charging. We are charging 19 pet fee, which is $10. We are not able to charge for them, because you mentioned it’s a service 20 animal.”). Patel did not recall when exactly the encounter became hostile but stated that he called 21 the police sometime after Goodman objected to paying the incidental fees. Id. at 4. 22 McNerney testified that Patel had difficulty understanding Goodman but ignored her 23 when she tried to type out statements to show him on her phone. Dkt. 42-4 at 2–3. McNerney 24 says he also told Patel that the hotel should not be charging a pet fee for a service dog and that ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 1 Patel slapped his hand away when McNerney pointed at the text at issue on the pet form. Id. at 3. 2 Patel then told Goodman and McNerney to leave and that he would be calling the police. See 3 Dkt. 40 at 3; Dkt. 42-4 at 3. Goodman also testified, in both her deposition and her declaration, 4 that Patel told them they could not stay at the hotel when they refused to pay the pet fee. Dkt. 34 5 at 35 (“So I said, ‘I’m refusing to pay the pet fee.’ He said, ‘Okay. Then get out. Get out.’”); 6 Dkt. 40 at 3 (“He was insistent that we needed to pay the pet fee or he would not allow us to stay 7 in the room.”) 8 9 Goodman agreed to leave but told Patel that she first wanted a refund of her pre-paid hotel room. Dkt. 40 at 3. Patel told her to contact Expedia. See Dkt. 40-1 at 2. Goodman then 10 requested a refund from Expedia customer service using a chat function while in the hotel lobby. 11 See Dkt. 40-1 at 1, 5, 9; Dkt. 41 at 2. Expedia customer service called the hotel to approve the 12 refund, Dkt. 40-1 at 5, the refund was approved, id. at 9, and Goodman and Mr. McNerney left 13 the hotel. Dkt. 40 at 4; Dkt. 41 at 2. III. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 A. LEGAL STANDARDS Jurisdiction and Applicable Law The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). First, the opposing parties are citizens of different states: Plaintiff Marie Goodman is a Washington citizen, Dkt. 1-1 at 1, while the member-owners of the Defendant limited liability company Coolvestment, Ashraf Ahmed and Enamu Amyeen, are both Oregon citizens, Dkt. 2 at 1; Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the domicile(s) of its members). Next, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, based on Goodman’s claims for non-economic compensatory damages, with the exact amount to be determined at trial. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 1-1 at 24 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 1 4. Because the Court is sitting in diversity, substantive claims are governed by state law. Erie 2 R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 3 B. Summary Judgment Standard 4 “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 5 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 7 jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 8 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 9 (1986)). And a fact dispute is “material” “only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the 10 governing law.” In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008). The moving party is entitled 11 to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on 12 an essential element of a claim for which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex 13 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985). 14 The evidence relied upon by the nonmoving party must be able to be “presented in a form 15 that would be admissible in evidence.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “‘The evidence of the 16 nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Tolan v. 17 Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Even 18 circumstantial evidence can defeat summary judgment if inferences drawn in the non-moving 19 party’s favor are reasonable. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 1988). 20 C. Washington Law Against Discrimination 21 The relevant provision of the WLAD states that there is a right to be free from 22 discrimination due to any “sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog 23 guide or service animal,” and an accompanying right to the full enjoyment of any public 24 accommodation. See RCW 49.60.030(1)(b). Implementing regulations for the law against ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 1 discrimination prohibit any requirement that a person with a disability accompanied by a trained 2 dog guide or service animal “pay an extra charge for the trained dog guide or service animal.” 3 See Wash. Admin. Code 162-26-070(2). IV. 4 5 DISCUSSION Coolvestment makes two arguments for summary judgment on Goodman’s remaining 6 claim for disability discrimination in public accommodation. See Dkt. 13 at 4–5; Dkt. 33 at 8–9; 7 Dkt. 37 at 1–2. First, Coolvestment argues that Goodman cannot show she was discriminated 8 against because her testimony—that Patel insisted on charging a pet fee for her service dog, and 9 then told her to leave when she refused to pay—is contradicted by McNerney and Patel’s 10 deposition testimony that Patel said no pet fee would be charged (even if the written form 11 required a pet fee). Dkt. 33 at 9. Second, Coolvestment argues Goodman lacks a basis for her 12 discrimination claim because she did not pay any prohibited fee and instead refused to finish 13 checking into the hotel. Dkt. 33 at 10. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 A. Summary judgment is prohibited because there remains a genuine dispute as to material facts. Coolvestment’s first argument, that Goodman’s discrimination claim is “supported by nothing more than speculation and self-serving testimony” Dkt. 33 at 7, is inapplicable at summary judgment. Although a declaration “that states only conclusions and not facts that would be admissible evidence” is insufficient to create a genuine fact dispute at summary judgment, factual testimony supporting a party’s claim may not be disregarded just because it is “selfserving.” Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497–98 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have previously acknowledged that declarations are often self-serving, and this is properly so because the party submitting it would use the declaration to support his or her position.”) Here, Goodman has testified as to her own recollection of the facts, which is admissible at trial and tends to 24 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 1 support her position, id., and the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in her favor and 2 accept her evidence as truthful at summary judgment. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 651. 3 Goodman’s testimony presents a genuine and direct dispute of material fact. She has 4 testified that Patel attempted to charge her a prohibited fee for lodging her service dog and then 5 denied her accommodation when she refused to pay. Dkt. 42-2 at 3. Patel has testified that he did 6 not attempt to charge such a fee, and instead made Goodman leave because she became hostile 7 while filling out check-in paperwork and refused the hotel’s incidental fees. See Dkt. 33 at 11; 8 Dkt. 42-1 at 4–5. Goodman and her fiancée have also testified that after she informed Patel that 9 she would not pay a pet fee for her service dog, Dkt. 42-2 at 3, he became hostile and told them 10 to leave the hotel and that he would call the police. Dkt. 40 at 3; Dkt. 42-4 at 3. 11 The WLAD prohibits charging for a service animal and denying a person full enjoyment 12 of public accommodation due to their disability. See RCW 49.60.030(1)(b); Wash. Admin. Code 13 162-26-070(2). Here, accepting Goodman’s testimony as true and drawing justifiable inferences 14 in her favor, McLaughlin, 849 F.2d at 1208–09, a reasonable jury could find Goodman was told 15 to leave the Days Inn and was denied an accommodation because of her disability and her use of 16 a service dog. While Coolvestment and Patel dispute Goodman’s account, this is precisely the 17 type of factual dispute that may not be resolved by the Court at summary judgment. In re 18 Barboza, 545 F.3d at 707; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061. 19 20 21 22 23 B. Coolvestment cannot disclaim discriminating against Goodman simply because it failed to collect a discriminatory fee. Coolvestment’s second argument, that Goodman did not suffer discrimination because she did not pay any prohibited discriminatory fee, is similarly unavailing. The WLAD prohibits charges for service animals, and for denying public accommodation on account of an individual’s disability. See RCW 49.60.030(1)(b); Wash. Admin. Code 162-26-070(2). Just 24 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 1 because a person refuses to pay a discriminatory fee and avoids such a charge does not mean 2 they avoided discrimination. The attempt to impose the charge is the discriminatory act, not 3 whether the subject of discrimination ultimately paid it. Moreover, in this case—drawing 4 justifiable inferences in Goodman’s favor—Goodman was told to leave the Days Inn because 5 she refused to pay the discriminatory pet charge. See Dkt. 40 at 3; Dkt. 42-4 at 3. This amounted 6 to a denial of a public accommodation because of Goodman’s disability (for which she had a 7 service animal) and would also violate the WLAD. See RCW 49.60.030(1)(b). V. 8 9 10 11 CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, Coolvestment’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 33) is DENIED. Dated this 3rd day of May, 2024. 13 A 14 Tiffany M. Cartwright United States District Judge 12 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
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