An averment in the bill of the diverse citizenship of the
parties is sufficient to make a
prima facie case of
jurisdiction so far as it depends on citizenship. While, under the
act of 1789, an issue as to the fact of citizenship can only be
made by plea of abatement, when the pleadings properly aver
citizenship, it is the duty of the court, under the Act of March 3,
1875, which is still in force, to dismiss the suit at any time when
its want of jurisdiction appears.
A motion to dismiss the cause based upon proofs taken by the
master is an appropriate mode in which to raise the question of
jurisdiction.
Residence and citizenship are wholly different things within the
meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining and regulating
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and a
mere averment of residence in a state is not an averment of
citizenship in that state for the purposes of jurisdiction.
One who has been for many years a citizen of a state is still a
citizen thereof although residing temporarily in another state, but
without any purpose of abandoning citizenship in the former.
The bill filed in the circuit court by the plaintiff, McQuesten,
alleged her to be "a citizen of the United States and of the State
of Massachusetts, and residing at Turner's Falls in said state,"
while the defendants, Steigleder and wife, were alleged to be
"citizens of the State of Washington, and residing at the City of
Seattle in said state."
The object of the suit was to obtain a decree adjudging
defendants to be trustees for the plaintiff in respect of certain
real estate in King County, State of Washington. The defendants
demurred to the bill for want of equity. The demurrer was
overruled, and the defendants answered, without making any issue as
to the citizenship of the parties but denying the alleged trust and
averring that there had been a final settlement between the parties
before the institution of the suit in respect of all the matters in
dispute.
The cause was referred to a master, and, after proof was
Page 198 U. S. 142
taken, the defendants moved the court to dismiss the suit for
want of jurisdiction, the reason assigned in the motion being only
that the plaintiff was, and for a long time prior to the
commencement of the suit had been, a "resident" of the State of
Washington, which the defendants were "residents" of the same
state.
The motion to dismiss was denied, and the case went to a decree
in favor of the plaintiff upon the merits.
The defendants were granted an appeal directly to this Court,
the question of jurisdiction being certified.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The averment in the bill that the parties were citizens of
different states was sufficient to make a
prima facie case
of jurisdiction so far as it depended on citizenship. While, under
the Judiciary Act of 1789, an issue as to the fact of citizenship
could only be made by plea in abatement when the pleadings properly
averred citizenship, the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, 472,
c. 137, made it the duty of the circuit court at any time in the
progress of a cause, to dismiss the suit if it was satisfied either
that it did not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the court, or that
the parties were improperly or collusively made or joined, either
as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case
cognizable or removable under the act of Congress.
Sheppard
v. Graves, 14 How. 505;
Williams v.
Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209,
104 U. S. 211;
Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138,
114 U. S. 143;
Little v. Giles, 118 U. S. 596,
118 U. S. 602;
Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315,
129 U. S. 326.
This provision of the act of 1875 was not superseded by the
Judiciary Acts of 1887, 1888, and is
Page 198 U. S. 143
still in force.
Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly,
160 U. S. 327,
160 U. S. 339;
Lake County v. Dudley, 173 U. S. 243,
173 U. S. 251;
Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U.
S. 184,
191 U. S.
194-195;
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.,
194 U. S. 48,
194 U. S. 66.
The motion, based upon the proofs taken by the master, to dismiss
the cause, was therefore an appropriate mode in which to raise the
question of the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
It is to be observed that the grounds assigned for the motion to
dismiss the cause, taken alone, did not distinctly raise any
question concerning the absence of diverse citizenship, for the
motion only stated that the plaintiff and the defendants were,
respectively, residents of the State of Washington. But it has long
been settled that residence and citizenship were wholly different
things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining
and regulating the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United
States, and that a mere averment of residence in a particular state
is not an averment of citizenship in that state for the purposes of
jurisdiction.
Parker v.
Overman, 18 How. 137;
Robertson v. Cease,
97 U. S. 646;
Everhart v. Huntsville Female College, 120 U.
S. 223;
Timmons v. Elyton Land Co.,
139 U. S. 378;
Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S. 121,
141 U. S. 123;
Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co.,
148 U. S. 389.
But the circuit court treated the question of jurisdiction as
raised, and passed upon it. We must therefore look at the evidence
bearing on that point.
Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance,
191 U. S. 184,
191 U. S.
194-195. The evidence warrants the conclusion reached by
that court -- namely, that the plaintiff was, for many years prior
to the commencement of the action, a citizen of Massachusetts, and
that her residence in the State of Washington at and before the
suit was brought is not shown to be otherwise than temporary,
without any fixed purpose to abandon citizenship in Massachusetts.
So far as appears from the record, she was, when the suit was
brought, a citizen of Massachusetts.
The circuit court did not err in taking jurisdiction of the
cause, and it will be so certified.